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On the Individuation of Words 
The idea that two words can be instances of the same word is a central intuition in our 
conception of language. This fact underlies many of the claims that we make about how 
we communicate, and how we understand each other. Given this, irrespective of what we 
think words are, it is common to think that any putative ontology of words, must be able 
to explain this feature of language. That is, we need to provide criteria of identity for 
word-types which allow us to individuate words such that it can be the case that two 
particular word-instances are instances of the same word-type (on the assumption that 
there are such types). One solution, recently further developed by Irmak (2018), holds 
that words are individuated by their history. In this paper, I argue that this view either 
fails to account for our intuitions about word identity, or is too vague to be a plausible 
answer to the problem of word individuation.  
I 
Perhaps the most defended view in the metaphysics of words are those views that posit 
genuinely existing word-types. Such views can be further split into the platonists that take 
word-types to be eternal abstract entities (Katz 1981, Wetzel 2009); and views that take 
word-types to be abstract artefacts (Irmak 2018). Despite various differences between 
these versions of type-realist views of words, most prominently concerning whether 
words are created or eternal entities, they agree that what is it for two particular word-
instances or tokens to be the same word is for them to both be instances of the same type.1 
This, naturally, leads to questions about the individuation of word-types and of word-
instances. Though connected, these two issues need to be carefully separated. The latter 
is the question of what connects word-instances such that two instances are instances of 
the same word-type. The former concerns how we differentiate the types themselves. The 
focus in this paper is on solutions to the problem of individuating word-types, and thus, 
unless specified, in the rest of this paper the term ‘word’ will refer to types, not instances. 
                                                 
1 Other prominent options, which I will not discuss here, are nominalism, which has been largely 
undefended since Quine (1960) and Bloomfield (1933), though see Miller (Ms.) for a recent, 
sympathetic discussion, and a stage-continuant model (see Kaplan 1990, 2011); 
  
It is well recognised that trying to individuate words through their phonetic, orthographic, 
or semantic properties is flawed. On so-called form- or shape-theoretic conceptions of 
words, which hold that two words are instances of the same word if they share the same 
relevant (physical) shape or form, a quick reflection on the multitude of different 
pronunciations, spellings, and examples of different handwriting and fonts makes it very 
hard to see what in terms of shape or form is truly had in common between intuitively 
genuine cases of multiple instances of the same word. Two people can clearly say the 
same word despite pronouncing the word differently. ‘Color’ and ‘colour’ are similarly 
the same word, despite the difference between US and British spelling. Homophones are 
distinct words even though they are pronounced the same, and ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ are 
distinct despite being spelt (and pronounced) in the same way.  
Further to this, it seems intuitively to be the case that words undergo phonetic and 
orthographic change. The ‘Great Vowel Shift’ did not create a new language.2 Even it 
were the case that the shift led to speakers struggling to understand some others, this does 
not mean that there was a change in language, nor a change in the identity of the words 
that underwent a change in their pronunciation. Thus, we can reject views that individuate 
words through their phonetic or orthographic properties. 
A semantic account fares little better. Words undergo semantic change just as they 
undergo phonetic and orthographic change. On some occasions, this even involves a word 
coming to mean something entirely distinct from its original meaning. Take the recently 
well-discussed (on the internet) example of many people using the word ‘literally’ as a 
near synonym of ‘figuratively’. This form of use is prevalent across many places online, 
and has got a lot of people very angry.3 Does this mean that the word has changed, or are 
                                                 
2 For more on the Great Vowel Shift, including on the debate about the causes of it, see Nevalainen 
and Traugott (2012). 
3 See https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/misuse-of-literally. Note also that literary 
greats such as F. Scott Fitzgerald, James Joyce, Charlotte Brontë, and Charles Dickens all used 
literally to mean figuratively on occasion. The supposed ‘modern’ use of the term is much 
older than some seem to realise. 
  
people using a homophone or homograph in such cases? It seems far more reasonable to 
think that, if anything, the meaning of the word has changed, and that the word itself 
remains the same.4 Semantics, therefore, is also not a good guide to the identity of words. 
In light of these, and other problems, theorists have explored versions of an account that 
places the historical properties or the origin of words as central to their individuation. 
Thus: 
Origin: Words w1 and w2 are identical iff w1 and w2 have the same originating event 
(where the originating event is the first performance of a word) (Hawthorne and Lepore 
2011: 477).5 
Origin, though, is still too crude a proposal. There are many cases in which words share 
an originating event, but are not intuitively the same word. Many distinct words in 
English, for example, derive from the same Latin root. Furthermore, it rules out 
unperformed words, or at least assumes that words only come into existence when 
performed. We might try to respond by allowing that a mental performance of a word is 
sufficient for origin, but either way, origin does not seem satisfactory due to its demand 
that there is for each word exactly one performance that is the first performance of that 
word (Hawthorne and Lepore 2011: 477). 
Irmak has used these problems to motivate a broader account where words are 
individuated via their history. This account places etymology at the centre of our inquiries 
into word identity: ‘Etymology, then, is not merely an empirical investigation concerning 
the history of words as linguistic units, but also a proper investigation of word identity’ 
(2018: 12), where what we are interested in tracking are the ‘changes in their orthographic 
                                                 
4 i.e. that this use did not bring into existence the homophonous word ‘literally’ such that we 
would now need to distinguish between two words: ‘literally1’ and ‘literally2’. Use, at best, 
changed what the singular word meant. 
5 Hawthorne and Lepore attribute this view to Richard (1990) and Millikan (1984). See also 
Kripke (1980).  
  
and phonological forms, and meanings and/or functions’ (2018: 12). Irmak thus proposes 
(2018: 12): 
History: Words w1 and w2 are identical if and only if they have the same history.  
We are not told what facts are included in history, but we can assume that given Irmak 
thinks that he view avoids the problems associated with origin, that they include both 
origin and other performance facts, potentially including the mental performances of 
words (if such events count as performances). Thus history does not require, as origin 
did, that there is exactly one event that is the first performance of a word. A word could 
have two distinct originating events, just so long as both events are part of the history of 
that word. 
History seems to give us the right answers for many of our intuitions about language. The 
difference between ‘color’ and ‘colour’ is insignificant as they share the same history. 
Homophones, homographs, and synonyms are distinct words because their histories are 
different, and ‘in virtue of significant differences in their histories, specifically the 
particular way and the time they were borrowed from the donor language, doublets are 
successfully rendered different yet cognate words despite sharing a common root’ (Irmak 
2018: 13). 
It is accepted that the view is not entirely without problems (Irmak 2018: 13). Words 
overlap and even share etymologies, both within a language, and across languages. That 
is, how and when do overlapping words become distinct under this account? How many 
new uses, and how distinct from other uses, before a new word exists? This is presented 
as a purely epistemological problem. In what remains, I will argue that the problem goes 
deeper, and that there is no interpretation of ‘same history’ that provides us with a 
plausible account of word individuation. 
II 
Let us canvass some possibilities, beginning with the strongest reading of ‘same’, where 
same means identical such that we get: 
History*: Words w1 and w2 are identical if and only if they have an identical history.  
  
However, read this way, History* means that words are, in fact, almost never identical. 
The reason for this is that history is an ever-growing set of (etymological) facts. The 
history of the words that I am producing instances of right now is different from those 
instanced by Jane Austen and Charles Dickens. This is, in part, because the history of my 
words includes the influential use of words by famous authors that may have adjusted 
their meaning, made them more popular, changed their spellings, or had any number of 
effects that contribute to that word’s history. The words that I am producing instances of 
have a history that includes their use by Austen, whilst Austen’s do not. Thus it cannot 
be that Austen and I ever instanced the same word. This, of course, works for more 
familiar cases too. ‘Color’ and ‘colour’ do not actually share an identical history as the 
history of ‘color’ includes various uses in America, whilst ‘colour’ in Britain (as well as 
various other differences). 
This is a serious enough issue that History* cannot be a plausible account of word 
individuation. If words cannot, in principle, be shared by speakers of the same language 
at two distinct times under a given theory, then I propose that that is sufficient reason to 
reject that theory of word individuation. 
An alternative might be to say it is enough that H1, the set of history facts that individuates 
w1, is subset of H2, the set of history facts that individuates w2. We might then say that 
when I write w1, and Austen has written w2, then w1=w2 iff all the facts that are members 
of H2 are members of H1. Thus, Austen and I can write the same word, despite H1 and H2 
not being identical. Thus we get: 
History**: Words w1 and w2 are identical if and only if they have the same history, or if 
the history of w1 is a subset of w2. 
This, though, will not work. One phenomenon we want to be able to explain is how 
borrowed words are new words in the language into which they are introduced, distinct 
from the different but cognate word with which they share a root. But History** does not 
allow for this. For example, ‘aardvark’ is a borrowed word in English from Afrikaans. In 
Afrikaans, ‘aardvark’ is now an obsolete term, having been replaced by ‘erdvark’.  
This shared root means that ‘aardvark’ and ‘erdvark’ have a significantly shared history. 
The English word has a history that includes all of the history of the (now obsolete) 
Afrikaans word as a subset. That is, the full etymology of ‘aardvark’ in English will 
  
include all the etymological facts of ‘aardvark’ in Afrikaans, at least up until the moment 
of that the word was borrowed. Thus, at that moment at least, the two words would satisfy 
history**, but intuitively they are still distinct words. 
Given this, we might say that the histories only have to be sufficiently similar: 
History***: Words w1 and w2 are identical if and only if they have the same or sufficiently 
similar history. 
However, this is so vague as to be unhelpful. Taking about the ‘aardvark’ example from 
above. ‘aardvark’ (in English) and ‘erdvark’ (the current term in Afrikaans) have a 
significantly shared history. Are they then the same word? For myself, intuitively they 
are not, but History*** leaves open the possibility that they are. At the same time, ‘color’ 
and ‘colour’, intuitively are the same, but History*** leaves open the possibility that they 
are not.  
The problem is that it is not clear at all how much similarity is required to determine 
questions about word identity. At worst, in the above case identity in history may not be 
sufficient for word identity: an English instance of “aardvark” and an Afrikaans instance 
of “erdwark” do not count as instances of the same word, despite sharing their history.  
It should be noted that such vagueness in the notion of ‘sufficient similarity’ is not unique 
to history, but is common to many of the proposals for word individuation. Versions of 
the same problem have been argued as being sufficient to reject the attempt to individuate 
words through their shape or form (Wetzel 2009; Hawthorne and Lepore 2011; Irmak 
2018), through meaning (Irmak 2018), and through the intentions of speakers (Cappelen 
2000). If we accept, as most have, such an issue to be enough to lead us to reject those 
other proposals, then it would seem that it should be enough to reject history too. 
III 
In what remains, I will respond to some immediate objections to my argument. 
It might be responded that I have confused word types with word instances. That is, that 
I have used history applied to word instances to make a point about a theory aimed at 
providing a criteria of identity for word types. However, whilst I have used word instances 
in making my point, in each case the question has been about whether history can provide 
  
individuating conditions for types. History is taken to provide a solution to that question 
as, by individuating word types, we aim to be able to individuate the instances. I asked 
whether w1, an instance of which was produced by Austen, is the same word as w2, an 
instance of which was produced by me, here in 2018. On any reasonable specification of 
how much history w1 and w2 must share to be identical, either the theory produces the 
wrong answer (e.g. Austen and I did not instance the same word), or becomes as vague 
as the previously outlined positions. Thus, though w1 and w2 are instances, the conclusion 
is about whether or not the proposed criteria of identity for the type, W, explains how w1 
and w2 are instances of the same word, 
One way that my objection could be avoided is by adopting a version of Platonism where, 
given that words are eternal unchanging entities, the history of a word already includes 
facts about uses of that word in the future (from our current perspective). This would 
avoid the problem as it would allow us to say that the word that Austen and I instance do 
have the same history, as the history of the word instanced by Austen (and me) includes 
all the facts relating to my use of the word, and all other instancings of the word. 
However, this immediately has some very strange consequences for how we think of 
words in that it would make it the case that the history of a word is predetermined, or 
even necessary. That is, if history already includes facts about all uses of a word in the 
future, then we would have to accept that those future uses could not be different, else the 
word would actually be a different word. This is highly counter-intuitive. We think that 
various aspects about language and words are contingent, including facts about whether, 
say, some word is adopted by some community of speakers, or comes to be spelt or 
pronounced in a different way. It should not be the case that how we individuate words 
means that it is necessary that ‘shew’ came later to be spelt ‘show’, or that a word will 
shift its meaning. 
Furthermore, this response would make the practical job of individuating words almost 
impossible. We simply would not know whether the full history of two instances of words 
used now are the same word as history includes relevant facts about future uses. Perhaps 
for the Platonist, this is not too problematic; they after all already have to handle 
objections about how it possible for us to in any sense come to know or grasp eternal 
  
unchanging abstract entities.6 However, this at least shows that the view is more counter-
intuitive than it might initially seem. 
Furthermore, even if those problems can be avoided, this route is not available to at least 
some realists about word-types such as Irmak who argues that words, though being 
abstract, still come into existence (2018). If words genuinely come into existence, then it 
seems as though it would not be the case that the word would have all of its historical 
facts at that moment of creation. If a major benefit of history is that we can maintain our 
intuitive way of speaking that a word’s history changes and grows over time, then that 
benefit would be lost if we adopt this response to the arguments above. 
One further response might be that I have been overly metaphysical in my reasoning here. 
Perhaps: 
looking for precise boundaries for word identity will either result in determinate answers 
to complicated cases where major revisions are required in our linguistic practices 
concerning word identity, or in so far as it attempts to respect and even justify such 
practices it will eventually fail. It must be noted that for the vast majority of cases the 
problem does not even arise. The concern here is about those cases where the similarities 
and differences in word histories are not even nearly decisive (Irmak 2018: 13) 
However, first, in the examples I have used here, I have shown that these concerns arise 
for all sorts of ordinary words. ‘aardvark’ is not an unusual case, and it is not a 
(particularly) uncommon word. It seems that these problems do not arise in the vast 
majority of cases only because we are not looking.  
Analogously, to those who have not read the metaphysical literature, the puzzles about 
material composition only arise in the most strange and extreme examples, but that should 
not that persuade us that there is no question there. We might have other reasons for 
thinking that the questions are non-substantive, but that we do not normally care about 
whether a table is really just particles-arranged-tablewise is by itself no reason to think 
that no good answer is forthcoming. Similarly, just because I do not, in ordinary 
                                                 
6 See Benacerraf 1965, 1983 and Field 1980, 1989 for discussion of such problems; see Wetzel 
2009 for a response to these concerns. 
  
conversation, stop the speaker to ask whether they are uttering an instance of ‘w1’ or ‘w2’ 
because the context tells which it is, not does free us from the metaphysical puzzle, 
irrespective of whether we want to be revisionists about linguistic practices or not.  
It may that determinate answers on this topic, as with many in metaphysics, would seem 
to require revisions to our linguistic practice, but only if we think that we should (let alone 
could) abide by correct metaphysical principles in all parts of our lives. Compositional 
nihilists do not think that people should stop talking as if composite objects exist. A 
revisionist metaphysics of words does not mean that we think that people should stop 
talking whatever way is best for them in a particular context. In both cases, if truly 
revisionary, then some account might be needed to explain why other less revisionary 
accounts should not be favoured. However, none of this is an argument against looking 
for precise boundaries; only to be aware of the consequences for any proposed precise 
boundaries on both philosophical and ‘common-sense’ contexts. 
IV 
The lack of a good account of criterion of individuation for words is well-recognised. 
This has lead Hawthorne and Lepore to the position of ‘sloppy realism’ wherein we accept 
that there must be some criterion of individuation for words, but that we cannot (at least 
currently) specify them (2011). Despite the arguments in this paper, I am more hopeful 
than that. Like Irmak, I do think that there are objective facts about the individuation of 
words (Irmak 2018: 13), even if such facts will involve facts about humans, and I think 
that we can at least improve on our accounts of what such facts are. But even granting 
this, history, as currently stated, is either too vague or too restrictive, and thus is not a 
significant improvement on previous theories of word individuation. 
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